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The paper engages with core-periphery 
conceptions because they are a useful 
Denkfigur in a time of increasing global 
interconnectedness. I argue that the core-
periphery metaphor is a useful one 
because it provides us with a relational 
tool of analysis and at the same time with 
a focus on asymmetric power relations. 
But it also has some serious limitations, 
such as a tendency to be over-determin-
istic and to be too global in scale. In order 
to address these limitations, I suggest 
re scaling Prebisch, Amin and Wallerstein’s 
global conception of core and periphery 
to the local scale. I hold that we need to 
“provincialize” the core-periphery meta-
phor, to borrow Chakrabarty’s (2000) 
famous term, and to make the agency of 
local actors more relevant to our under-
standing of political dynamics in the 
MENA region. This paper sketches how 
“provincialized” and “localized” ways of 
using the core-periphery metaphor could 
look. This part builds on the main ideas 
Malika Bouziane, Anja Hoffmann and I 
developed in the introduction to our 
volume Local Politics and Contemporary 
Transformations in the Arab World, as 
well as my approach of a “state analysis 
from below.”
Keywords: Core-Periphery; Agency-Struc-
ture; Politics Beyond the Center; Arab 
Transformations
The main reason for me to engage with 
core-periphery conceptions is the need to 
link issues of structure and agency in a 
time of increasing global interconnected-
ness. The core-periphery metaphor is a 
useful one because it provides us (1) with 
a relational tool of analysis and (2) with a 
focus on asymmetric power relations. 
However, this tool has some serious limita-
tions, such as a tendency to be over- 
deterministic and to be too global in scale. 
In order to address these limitations, I 
suggest rescaling Prebisch, Amin and 
Wallerstein’s global conception of core 
and periphery to the local scale. I hold 
that we need to “provincialize” the 
core periphery metaphor, to borrow 
Chakrabarty’s (2000) famous term, and to 
make the agency of local actors more rel-
evant to our understanding of political 
dynamics in the Maghreb, Mashriq and 
Gulf1 region. I offer my approach of a “state 
analysis from below” as a way of linking 
structure and agency on the national and 
local scale. In the last paragraphs of this 
essay, I will briefly sketch how “provincial-
ized” and “localized” ways of using the 
core-periphery metaphor could look. This 
part builds on the main ideas Malika 
Bouziane, Anja Hoffmann and I developed 
in more detail in the introduction to our 
volume Local Politics and Contemporary 
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Relationality and Asymmetries: Why the 
Core-Periphery Metaphor Is Useful
The idea of core-periphery relations as 
relations of economic and political domi-
nation was first used by the Economic 
Commission of Latin America and Raúl 
Prebisch in the 1950s to denote a specific, 
uneven division of labor in the world-
economy between the North, the former 
imperial and colonial forces, and the 
South, the colonized peoples and econo-
mies. This idea was picked up, criticized 
and refined by different strands of depen-
dency theories, which hold that this 
inequality is a necessary result and pre-
condition of world capitalism. Amin, 
Wallerstein and others used it as an inte-
gral part of what Wallerstein later called 
world-systems analysis (Modern World-
System I, World-Systems Analysis). 
Wallerstein argues that socioeconomic, 
political and historical developments 
should be analyzed in a relational way on 
a global rather than national level. He 
holds that so far in human history, there 
have been three kinds of systems: mini-
systems, world-empires, and world- 
economies. The contemporary world- 
system is a capitalist world-economy.
Building on Prebisch, Wallerstein uses 
core-periphery in the sense that it 
denotes periphery-like and core-like pro-
duction processes rather than countries, 
but it can be used as shorthand for states 
as well. Wallerstein proposes that “the 
key element distinguishing core-like from 
peripheral processes is the degree to 
which they are monopolized and there-
fore profitable” (World-Systems Analysis 
93). Thus, as a result, periphery encom-
passes marginalized, less developed, 
economically less productive spaces or 
zones, which are dominated by a core, 
which is extracting surplus in an unequal 
exchange. His definition already hints to 
the two very productive aspects of his 
conceptualization: the relationality of the 
concept and the focus on power and 
domination. I will discuss these in light of 
some of the important insights of feminist 
theorizing of gender relations and power 
in order to assess the benefits and the 
limits of the concept.
(1) Relationality is a very useful Denkfigur. 
Relationality is not loaded normatively, as 
interactions of all types can be non- 
hierarchical as well as asymmetric and 
include material and non-material dimen-
sions. For example, feminist reflections 
on concepts such as “femininity” or 
“masculinity” show that these can only be 
grasped in a relational manner. Our 
understanding of “man” is always linked 
to corresponding understandings of 
what “woman” is. This essential link is also 
inherent in the core-periphery metaphor. 
The center is materially and symbolically 
constituted through the existence of a 
periphery and vice versa. 
In feminist theorizing, such an understand-
ing of relationality also implies that 
gender relations are not unidirectional 
relations of simple and violent domina-
tion. Rather, intersectional approaches in 
feminist theory as developed, for exam-
ple, by Crenshaw, teach us that relations 
of power can take many different shapes 
along the lines of class, race, gender, dis-
ability or sexual orientation. An actor’s 
positionality might change accordingly, 
depending on her different material and 
non-material resources in a given field, to 
borrow from Bourdieu (Distinction). Thus, 
gender relations are constituted both by 
structures and processes: people do gen-
der and gender is being done. I suggest 
that the same can be said for core-periph-
ery relations: they are as much determined 
by economic and political structures as 
they are shaped by individual and collec-
tive actors and their practices. This also 
implies that power is more than the capac-
ity to dominate. It is rather a ubiquitous 
and productive force in the Foucauldian 
(Discipline and Punish) sense. It links dis-
cursive, symbolic and material spaces. 
Core-periphery relations in such a sense, 
then, are manifold, and their dynamics 
cannot just be understood as a function of 
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economic dominance. This in turn involves 
the need to make agency more relevant to 
the argument. In order to do so, I suggest 
analyzing the intersections of global struc-
tures and local actors on a national scale 
using “state analysis from below” rather 
than “world-systems analysis.” 
(2) In the world-systems analysis, asym-
metric power relations are at the heart of 
core-periphery relations on a global 
scale. They are part of the current capi-
talist world-economy, which emerged in 
the 16th century after a prolonged crisis 
of feudalism in Europe. Through these 
socioeconomic transformations, differ-
ent countries of a core, a semi-periphery 
and a periphery emerged. The European 
core historically built its political and 
economic dominance on the exploita-
tion of the periphery by extracting 
resources and raw material, thus creating 
surplus. This surplus is then turned into 
economies of high productivity creating 
wealth. In between these two lies the 
semi-periphery which includes econo-
mies and states which display some 
characteristics of the center and the 
periphery alike. “… [T]hey trade core-like 
products to peripheral zones and 
peripheral products to core zones” 
(Wallerstein, World-Systems Analysis 
97). Even though this conceptualization 
might sound overly simplistic and static, 
it still captures structures of global 
inequality very well. A United Nations 
report from 2013 states: 
In 2010, high-income countries—that 
accounted for only 16 per cent of the 
world’s population—were estimated to 
generate 55 per cent of global income. 
Low-income countries created just 
above one per cent of global income 
even though they contained 72 per 
cent of global population. An average 
gross domestic product (GDP) per 
capita of $2,014 in sub-Saharan Africa in 
2010 stood out against regional GDPs 
per capita of $27,640 in the European 
Union and $41,399 in North America. 
(United Nations 25)
But of course, such statements need inter-
sectional differentiation, as I explained 
above. They need to be provincialized 
and discussed on more than one scale. 
Thus we get a more nuanced picture 
along the lines of gender, class, race, reli-
gion, and sexual orientation. The latest 
World Development Report shows that 
women represent 40 percent of the 
world’s labor force but hold just 1 percent 
of the world’s wealth (World Bank 46). 
Wage gaps persist: salaried women work-
ers earn 62 cents for every US$1 that men 
earn in Germany, 64 cents in India and 
about 80 cents in Mexico and Egypt. 
Women and girls are more likely to die 
relative to men and boys in low and 
middle-income countries, with 3.9 million 
“missing” women and girls each year 
under the age of 60, the report says (xxi). 
In education, women now account for 
more than half of the world’s university 
students, and 60 countries have more 
young women than men in universities. 
Primary education disparities between 
boys and girls have closed in almost all 
nations. And in secondary education, girls 
now outnumber boys in 45 developing 
countries. But ethnicity combined with 
poverty can be a barrier: two-thirds of 
out-of-school girls around the world 
belong to ethnic minority groups (xx).
The political implications of these global 
structures of inequality are far reaching, 
according to Wallerstein (Modern World-
System I). The economies of the core led 
to wealth and thus to the establishment of 
strong welfare states which tend to live in 
peace whith each other. The states of the 
periphery, on the other hand, are weak, as 
they lack the resources to manage inter-
nal conflicts over access to these 
resources. The states of the semi-periph-
ery function as a buffer zone between the 
core and the rest. They are mostly author-
itarian states, as their economies are not 
fully productive and the state structure is 
weak. Wallerstein holds that this is not a 
static system, as states might rise and fall. 
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Thus, the core-periphery metaphor helps 
to situate states on the political and eco-
nomic map of the world. 
Still, I argue—much in line with earlier 
criticisms—that these generalizations 
need specification. A brief look at struc-
turalist and functionalist arguments 
engaged with explaining the Arab upris-
ings will add some evidence to my claim. 
For example, all countries that have seen 
sustained mass mobilisation (Tunisia, 
Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Libya, Syria) in 
2011 are peripheral countries in view of 
world-systems theory. A closer look at the 
economic performance shows significant 
differences, though, such as between 
Yemen, Libya and Bahrain concerning 
(oil) wealth. In all states, poverty and 
social inequality can be found, Libya 
being the outlier. Nevertheless, a periph-
eral position, poverty and exclusion do 
not automatically induce protest, and 
vice versa. Thus, Yemen, Egypt and Tunisia 
have very little in common regarding 
basic indicators such as GDP, degree of 
literacy and overall productivity, but they 
could all shake free from their authoritar-
ian rulers in 2011. Since then, these coun-
tries have embarked on quite different 
trajectories, which are of course influ-
enced by structural factors. But I hold that 
these developments are linked to local 
dynamics of political contestation in 
relation to structural factors such as 
regime type, resource endowment, or 
position as peripheral state. This in turn 
implies that actors and their actions, 
resources and beliefs are at the core of 
these local dynamics. Not the least, 
actions have an impact on actors and the 
ensuing processes of contestation, thus 
creating a degree of open-endedness 
and arbitrariness in the process itself. 
The same is true for geopolitical dynam-
ics, which are part and parcel of the core-
periphery approach. Even though of 
course global power relations are heavily 
asymmetric, in the framework of globaliza-
tion, they underwent some structural 
change well before the Arab uprisings and 
can thus not be used in order to explain 
large-scale political unrest in 2011. Power 
has shifted in three directions: upward, 
downward, and sideward, as Jessop noted 
already in 2000 (75). For the states of the 
Maghreb, Mashriq and Gulf as elsewhere, 
this means it shifted to transnational 
actors, non-state actors, and non-Arab 
actors already since 2003 due to the Iraq 
war (Harders and Bank 411-12). These pro-
cesses have been exacerbated in the 
aftermath of the 2011 uprisings. The violent 
re-negotiation of the regional order 
includes the emergence of new social 
actors and transnational networks and the 
growing sideward shift of political power, 
influence, and authority away from the 
Mediterranean coastline toward the 
Persian Gulf. These shifts have a significant 
impact on the violent conflicts in Libya, 
Syria, Iraq and Yemen. Still, the ensuing 
dynamics are quite varied: in Syria, any 
internationally negotiated solution is 
locked into a classic interstate cold-war 
scenario between Russia/China and 
Western powers. The intensive involve-
ment of regional and international actors 
in sponsoring local armed groups with 
transnational links both to the West, (Gulf) 
Arab states, Turkey and Iran further com-
plicates the picture and is at the same time 
indicative of sideward power shifts. The 
rise of a translocal non-state military actor 
such as ISIS since 2014 epitomizes these 
ongoing downward shifts. This is rein-
forced by the fact that ISIS is explicitly not 
interested in stabilizing the existing nation-
states but rather in creating new sovereign 
structures with quite different shapes, thus 
challenging the model and practice of the 
conventional Middle Eastern nation-state. 
In Yemen in 2015, a Saudi-led alliance is 
imposing air strikes on the country in 
order to fight Shia Houthi militias. The 
Houthi militias in turn had been involved 
in violently challenging the regime long 
before 2011 and in the course of the con-
flict became increasingly transnational-
ized through the involvement of regional 
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actors such as Iran. Libya’s disintegration, 
in contrast, ceased to attract much interest 
from regional and international state 
actors except European activities to con-
trol migration movements across the Med-
iterranean. Again, the effects of global 
power asymmetries, I hold, can only fully 
be grasped in relation to local agency and 
dynamics of contestation. 
Alternative Perspectives on Core-Periph-
ery Relations
What could such “provincialized” and 
“localized” ways of using the core-periph-
ery metaphor look like? Provincialization 
implies more specificity in understanding 
how state-society relations play out on and 
among different scales such as the local, 
national, regional or international. Rather 
than assuming that these all work more or 
less in the same way in peripheral states, 
we need to theorize (1) the complex inter-
play between agency and structure more 
systematically and (2) link this to a deeper 
reflection on the “local.” In order to 
theorize state-society relations, then, I use 
the analytical framework of a “state analy-
sis from below,” which I developed else-
where in more detail (Staatsanalyse, 
“Bringing the Local”). In order to under-
stand “the local” better, I build on the col-
laborative intellectual efforts Malika 
Bouziane, Anja Hoffmann and I made in 
the framework of a research project in the 
SFB 700 “Governance in Areas of Limited 
Statehood” and the book Local Politics 
and Contemporary Transformations in the 
Arab World: Governance Beyond the 
Centre that was published as a result. 
What is “state analysis from below”? It is an 
analytical framework which draws on criti-
cal, feminist, constructionist, and ethno-
graphic works as sources of inspiration. It 
is embedded in the qualitative paradigm 
and builds on critical feminist methodolo-
gies. The approach is grounded in social 
theory, as it looks at the material and non-
material dimensions of power relations 
and the ways these are both narrated and 
practiced. More specifically, in my 2002 
book I built on Bourdieu’s conceptualiza-
tion of agency and structure in order to 
understand how actors use their different 
social, cultural, and symbolic capital while, 
for example, acting in the political field 
(Bourdieu, Distinction, Über den Staat). 
The approach thus contributes to the 
understanding of state-society relations in 
the broadest sense while looking at micro 
dynamics on the local scale, thus inscrib-
ing itself thoroughly in theory-oriented 
critical area studies. It offers a specific 
research perspective on “the state” as heu-
ristic object of inquiry, which is under-
stood by looking at local political dynam-
ics, institutions and actors. The approach 
of a “state analysis from below” focuses on 
political dynamics rather than (regime) 
stability.2 It stresses the agency of actors, 
their resources, interests and belief sys-
tems within the given material and non-
material structures, which enable or hin-
der certain actions. I thus focus on the 
dynamic and contradictory relations 
between “the state” and “society” rather 
than on the formal institutions and organi-
zations, national arenas and political elites. 
Rather than assuming that “the state” or its 
agents deliver public services and 
contribute to the welfare, security, and 
inclusion of citizens, as a more mainstream 
political science definition of state and 
state functions would imply, I start from the 
local practices of an “everyday state” with 
limited hegemony. The state, then, is taken 
to be a translocal institution and a space 
of contestation and power struggles struc-
tured by a social contract. These struggles 
are embedded in specific historical, sym-
bolic-discursive, social, institutional, cul-
tural, and economic contexts. They consti-
tute “politics,” understood here in a broad 
sense, which become visible on the local 
scale and can empirically be operational-
ized as different types of participation.
The main link between these structures 
and individual and/or collective agency 
in this approach is the concept of a “social 
contract,” which defines the “rules of the 
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game.” These rules are geared towards 
the creation of legitimacy for the current 
state of affairs while at the same time 
materially securing authoritarian rule. For 
example, the Egyptian social contract is 
authoritarian and informal in nature; citi-
zens basically swap political rights for 
development and economic welfare 
(Harders, Staatsanalyse; Büttner and Büt-
tner). The social contract is based on cer-
tain “logics of action,” which structure the 
belief systems and expectations of differ-
ent actors. Such logics of action in turn 
deeply influence the political structures, 
institutions and core beliefs of major 
actors, as Horst, Jünemann and Rothe 
argue in their “Logics of Action approach” 
(LoA). Empirically, it can be traced 
through, for example, looking at the 
belief systems of actors. In the Egyptian 
case, I argued that before (and even after) 
2011 five logics of action dominated for 
elite actors: limited political liberalization, 
limited economic liberalization, Islamiza-
tion, informalization and repression.
The social contract of informality came 
under growing pressure in the last ten to 
fifteen years due to different develop-
ments such as neoliberal reforms, demo-
graphic change, media innovations (sat-
ellite-TV and the Internet) and changing 
gender relations. Thus, increasingly 
dynamic societies were confronted with 
increasingly ossified authoritarian regime 
elites clinging to their power. Rapid social 
change was not met with political open-
ings, leading to “transformation without 
transition.” This in turn enabled people to 
increasingly challenge social contracts, 
leading to a protracted crisis of legiti-
macy in the Arab region. In this view, the 
wave of mass protest, which happened in 
2011 in the Arab world, was basically trig-
gered by a crisis of legitimacy, and the 
ensuing power struggles can be under-
stood as the oftentimes violent attempts 
to re-negotiate the social contracts. At 
the same time, structures and actors 
interact and are co-determined: the 
dynamics of mass protest, revolution and 
their aftermath are the product of logics 
of action of contentious agents. Their 
actions have an impact on existing struc-
tures and vice versa. Such a relational 
perspective is explicit in the world- 
systems analysis but on a rather global 
scale. I hold that this can be and should 
be re-scaled to the local level, as the local 
is both the testing ground and a con-
tested ground for new developments 
(Harders, “Bringing the Local”).
What does this mean and how can the 
local be conceptualized both as a research 
perspective and object of inquiry? In the 
introduction to our volume Contemporary 
Transformations in the Arab World: Gover-
nance Beyond the Centre, Malika Bouziane, 
Anja Hoffmann and I argue that most 
prominently, the Arab uprisings of 2011 
have demonstrated that “so-called pe-
ripheral” spaces and seemingly margi-
nal actors have been vital in triggering 
major changes on the regime level; 
challenges to authoritarian gover-
nance are often first visible and viable 
in these local spaces of both resistance 
and acquiescence. It is on the local 
scale that power relations become 
tangible and abstract concepts such 
as “state” and “politics” observable. 
(“Analyzing Politics” 3)
Thus, looking at the micro-dynamics of 
struggles for power over material and 
non-material resources offers a more 
complex picture of authoritarian rule in 
the (semi-) periphery than much of the 
functionalist literature has it. These strug-
gles are “simultaneously localized and 
globalized, connected to different scales 
and timeframes” (3). We avoid core-
periphery language and instead speak 
about dynamics “beyond the center” in 
order to make space for the idea that 
there is more than one center and that 
these centers are the contested product 
of continuous social struggles. Picking up 
on the idea that there are structural and 
systematic differences between the cen-
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ter and the rest, we also look at the discur-
sive level of these differences. 
While economic distance from the 
center might be measured by citizens’ 
access to infrastructure and welfare, 
it is difficult to quantify people’s self- 
perception of being socially or politi-
cally marginalized. Nevertheless, the 
spaces discussed here are characte-
rized by a certain distance from the 
center with regard to power, practices 
of sovereignty, logics of violence, and 
allocation of resources. (6) 
Spaces beyond the center, we hold, are 
often framed as being meaningless and 
inferior. These discourses mirror the exist-
ing sociopolitical order, and they are met 
by both resistance and subordination. As 
Bouziane shows in her work on the Jorda-
nian town of Ma’an, its inhabitants inter-
pret central politics as being dominated 
by the idea that the town needs control 
and punishment due to its unruly history. 
Morocco’s mid-Atlas town of Luant is 
regarded as part of the so-called “useless 
Morocco,” as Hoffmann shows in her work. 
This terminology is intentionally used by 
actors in the socioeconomic and political 
center of Morocco to demarcate scales 
and places of power/powerlessness. Such 
an epistemological move is highly pro-
ductive in the sense that it creates the 
“useless Morocco” it presumes to describe, 
and at the same time it is met by very con-
crete local opposition (Hoffmann). In the 
same vein, Lenner, in her study on Jordan, 
critically engages with the politics of con-
structing “poverty pockets,” the dominant 
narrative used in Jordanian development 
politics. She shows how “poverty pockets” 
are defined and chosen in an assemblage 
of national and local actors’ strategies 
imbued by international donors’ priorities 
as much as by the government’s need to 
include or appease specific communities. 
She links the global with the national scale 
without assuming patterns of domination 
but rather looking at the ways in which 
dominant international narratives are 
translated to the Jordanian context. 
Through the use of indicators, Lenner 
argues, poverty alleviation politics are 
“rendered technical.” Thus, much energy 
is invested in debates about the “right” 
poverty line rather than addressing issues 
of inequality and distribution of wealth 
and access to resources. 
These studies draw on critical debates 
inspired by the “cultural turn” in social sci-
ences, which engages with the power and 
productivity of language and discourse. 
This has serious methodological implica-
tions. In her famous essay about “situated 
knowledges,” feminist thinker Donna 
Haraway engages with the methodologi-
cal dilemmas which emerge from femi-
nists’ and radical constructionists’ criticism 
of conventional, positivist science. She 
criticizes the idea of a neutral, godlike sci-
entific gaze on the world from nowhere 
and argues for “the view from a body, 
always a complex, contradictory, structur-
ing, and structured body, versus the view 
from above, from nowhere, from simplicity” 
(589) as a basic prerequisite to create “sit-
uated knowledges” rather than seemingly 
“objective” science. 
Taking these methodological reflections 
as a starting point, we also struggled with 
the politics of naming. By using the term 
“beyond the center” we both link up to 
and disconnect from the center-periphery 
metaphor. Why? Thinking in dichotomic 
categories tends to be reductionist, as it 
presupposes that there are only two sides 
or spaces to look at. We hold that there is 
more beyond the core than just periphery 
in the classic sense, and in this essay I 
have presented a complex matrix of 
scales and actors which cannot be caught 
in a simple dichotomy. Thus, in our book 
we speak about the so-called “periphery” 
in order to leave space for the emergence 
of perceptions which go beyond a simple 
relationship of domination. By not naming 
the periphery as such, we stress the role 
of agency in politics as we understand it. 
This allows us to better account for local 
narratives and perceptions of the multiple 
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power dynamics embedded in center-
periphery relations. 
But, by way of auto-critique of our concep-
tualization, I would like to hint at the limits 
of this suggestion. If what is “beyond the 
center” is not named, we repeat an exclu-
sionary epistemological gesture of with-
holding even a name or a signifier for the 
periphery. Only the center is named as 
“center;” the periphery is just delineated 
to be everything “beyond the center.” 
Such a move reifies the centrality and 
power of the center on the discursive 
level. So, both options come with limita-
tions. The core-periphery concept is 
heavily loaded in a deterministic and 
economistic way, but the idea of just nam-
ing the center as such and leaving the rest 
“beyond” is just as problematic. The same 
is true of the “from below” metaphor I 
have been using. Even though it stresses 
the periphery rather than the center in 
directing our gaze to “below,” it also 
reproduces the vertical hierarchies of 
being on top or being below. The meta-
phor implies that messy realities can be 
sorted in such an orderly way. This is, as I 
already alluded to, not just a scientific illu-
sion but a powerful and highly productive 
gesture, which serves to render this mess-
iness understandable and thus controlla-
ble. Not the least, it also inscribes itself in 
an emancipatory intellectual trajectory—
such as a feminist or Marxist one—which 
has also produced highly problematic and 
romanticized accounts of “giving voice to 
the suppressed” or being in possession of 
a not-so-false consciousness. As Donna 
Haraway puts it: 
So, I think my problem, and “our” pro-
blem, is how to have simultaneously 
an account of radical historical con-
tingency for all knowledge claims and 
knowing subjects, a critical practice for 
recognizing our own “semiotic tech-
nologies” for making meaning, and a 
no-nonsense commitment to faithful 
accounts of a “real” world, one that can 
be partially shared and that is friendly 
to earth-wide projects of finite free-
dom, adequate material abundance, 
modest meaning in suffering, and limi-
ted silliness. (579)
Her answer to this problem is “situated 
knowledges” and a different type of 
science. She concludes: 
Science becomes the paradigmatic 
model, not of closure, but of that which 
is contestable and contested. Sci-
ence becomes the myth, not of what 
escapes human agency and respon-
sibility in a realm above the fray, but, 
rather, of accountability and respon-
sibility for translations and solidarities 
linking the cacophonous visions and 
visionary voices that characterize the 
knowledges of the subjugated. (590)
It is in this sense that I proposed to use the 
core-periphery metaphor while building 
on research which has been produced by 
the team of the Center for Politics in the 
Maghreb, Mashriq and Gulf at FU Berlin in 
recent years (Center for Middle Eastern 
and North African Politics). In light of these 
conceptual debates and empirical find-
ings, I argued that in order to strengthen 
the analytical use of the core-periphery 
concept, it needs to be provincialized and 
localized. This can be done by, for exam-
ple, using my approach of a “state analysis 
from below” or by looking at “governance 
beyond the center.” This enables us to 
imbue our analysis of core-periphery rela-
tions with a better understanding of the 
role of agency, resistance and the multi-
scalar power struggles which link the 
many different cores with the quite varie-
gated peripheries. 
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Notes
1 I use different terms such 
as Arab world, Middle East 
and North Africa, Maghreb, 
Mashriq and Gulf in order 
to demarcate “the region,” 
which is both a political 
construct and a political 
reality. As all terms carry 
serious limitations, e.g. with 
regard to their colonial roots 
and geopolitical implications, 
I use them intermittently.
2  The following paragraph 
is based on Harders, 
“Bringing the Local Back In.” 
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